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BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE  
MARITIME AWARENESS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This research project develops a business case analysis model to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of utilizing the Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) system 
within the DoD.  The business case analysis model was developed to conduct a detailed 
evaluation of the economic costs and benefits associated with CMA.  The initial 
hypothesis favored CMA as a superior alternative to the existing system, Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA).  Throughout the course of the research, this opinion was 
solidified and supported based on a series of factors.  These factors are expressed and 
outlined in the observations, conclusions and recommendations.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
A constant drive resides within the military and governments of the United States 
to identify, locate, and track all vessels on the seas throughout the world.  This takes a 
combined effort of combat systems, intelligence resources, and the most recent 
technologies to build a complex vehicle that can accomplish full identification and 
tracking of all vessels.  At this time, there is not any country in the world capable of 
attaining 100% identification and tracking of vessels on the seas.  In fact, that is most 
likely impossible, but strides in this direction can be attained.   
 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to analyze the current Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) system in place, demonstrate what Continuous Maritime Awareness 
(CMA) is and show implementing CMA is a step in the right direction to accomplish 
maritime supremacy.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research study will provide insight as to why CMA is a viable system, both 
systematically and economically.  In particular, the research will apply a Cost Benefit 
Analysis approach to determine CMA’s creditability in the current operating structure.   
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will apply the Cost Benefit Analysis methodology to CMA in order to 
provide insight on CMA.  The process will include process flow diagrams, conceptual 
documents, and literature review of pertinent documents.  From this process, the CBA 
will be analyzed from an operational perspective to show advantages and disadvantages.   
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E. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will be demonstrated in the operational value CMA 
provides to the US Navy.  Providing the costs and benefits associated, the research 
process will focus on the inabilities of the current system and how CMA can improve 
upon the current capability.    
 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I provides an overview of the thesis with regard to purpose and scope.  
Also, research objectives and questions will be addressed.  Finally, the methodology used 
to generate the final conclusions will be provided.   
Chapter II provides a background understanding of MDA, how the current system 
operates, and opportunities for future research.  This chapter shares a foundation of 
information required to build understanding and draw conclusions in later chapters.   
Chapter III describes CMA, its objectives, and how it can be applied to the current 
operating system. 
Chapter IV outlines a basic business case analysis structure.  The keys to this 
chapter reside in the benefits and costs associated with CMA.   
Chapter V reveals conclusions, and recommendations based on the research 
provided.  
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II. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 
A. DESCRIPTION OF MDA 
In order to understand MDA, a definition of the actual maritime domain is 
required.  The maritime domain is defined as:    
All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances.1 
Essentially, everything associated with the earth’s sea is part of the domain.  
Therefore, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is having full and timely knowledge on 
everything within the maritime domain.  The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
defines Maritime Domain Awareness as: 
The effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of the United States.  MDA is a key component of an active, 
layered maritime defense in depth.  It will be achieved by improving our 
ability to collect, fuse, analyze, display, and disseminate actionable 
information and intelligence to operational commanders. 2      
MDA demands as much actionable intelligence as possible about everything that 
happens on the earth’s water in order to protect our country from any harm which is the 
foundation of our counterterrorism program and maritime law enforcement operations.  
Figure 1 shows the interconnected network of how the MDA program intends to work.  
All parties involved are connected and working together to achieve maritime domain 
awareness.  
                                                 
1U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for 
the National Strategy for Maritime Security, open-file report, 2 (October 2005). 
2Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 1.   MDA Network3 
 
B. MDA OBJECTIVES 
President Bush signed two directives on 21 December 2004; the National Security 
Presidential Directive-41 and the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-
41/HSPD-13) established the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee.  This 
committee was responsible for the development of a National Strategy for Maritime 
Security and the eight supporting implementation plans outlined below. 4 
• National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an 
 effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could 
 impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States and identifying 
 threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. 
• Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all 
 available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime 
 Domain. 
• Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan aims for coordinated U.S. Government 
 response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by 
 establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly 
 and decisively. 
                                                 
3U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  Maritime Domain Awareness: Information Sharing, 
Processes and Partnerships. (April 19, 2005), accessed September 10, 2006. 
http://www.ndia.org/Content/ContentGroups/Divisions1/International/MDA_USCG.ppt#457. 
4U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for 
the National Strategy for Maritime Security, open-file report, 2 (October 2005). 
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• International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to 
coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and 
international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime 
security. 
• Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures and standards for the 
 recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption. 
• Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the President’s call for 
 recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework 
 regarding the maritime domain. 
• Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the 
 maritime supply chain. 
• Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and 
 implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13. 
 
The three primary plans are to develop a common operating picture, leverage 
partnerships within the MDA community and develop the infrastructure necessary to 
support MDA information management.  These plans or objectives were implemented 
primarily to protect the United States from anyone that wants to do harm via the water.  If 
achieved, these objectives should decrease the probability of another terrorist attack.  One 
thing is almost certain, this will not stop all terrorist attacks but achieving MDA should 
make our borders more secure.  The attack on 11 September 2001 alarmed many to the 
vulnerabilities that existed in the defense of our own country, and 95,000 miles of 
coastline was one of them. 
The enemies our nation faces today are diverse, unpredictable, relentless and 
highly networked.  With the increased concern over weapons of mass destruction and 
growing numbers of hostile states, the MDA program was established to counter such a 
threat.  Our economy has become more globally connected through increased shipping, 
lower transaction costs and lower restrictions on trade, which has ultimately increased 
our reliance on foreign national goods.  U.S. industry relies on just in time delivery of 
goods, creating tremendous pressures on inspectors and regulators to keep commerce 
flowing at all reasonable costs.  Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB) handles a third of 
west coast oil and almost half the west coast containers; no other U.S. port can 
accommodate the capacity if LA/LB closed.  Houston is critical to production of 
petroleum products.  Port Everglades is only port in South Florida capable of off-loading 
and refining oil.  The ports of Boston and New York were closed at about 9:45 11 
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September 2001.  We were forced to reopen these two ports by noon on 13 September 
2001, not because it was safe to do so, but because New England had reached critically 
low inventory levels of gasoline and fuel oil. 5  Reliance on oil is only one example, but 
all imported goods have a major impact on the price levels in our country, which makes 
the balance between national security and free trade more difficult. 
Several other factors contribute to our concern over domain awareness.  There are 
increased incidences of piracy and hijacking that pose a threat to the free flow of 
international commerce.  There is ongoing use of commercial vessels for smuggling and 
trafficking in people, drugs and other contraband, including weapons.   There is a 
growing concern over the potential use of commercial maritime vessels to support 
terrorist activities, including smuggling terrorists and weapons of mass destruction or 
hijacking a vessel for use in a terrorist attack against areas or assets of U.S. national 
interest, including sea lines of communication, U.S. Military forces or international ports.   
 
 On January 20, 2002, President Bush made the following statement:  
The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate 
information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, 
cargo and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime 
boundaries. 6 
  
Recently, President Bush signed the $7.4 billion Port Security Bill, which directs 
spending to new port security inspectors, nuclear weapons screening and developing an 
automated system to pinpoint high-risk cargo. 7  This particular legislation shows 
bipartisan agreement on increased port security and the strength of the commitment by 
the $7.4 billion dollar price tag.  This bill does not, however, provide 100% screening of 
all ships exiting foreign ports en route to the United States.  "One hundred percent 
screening of every container will shut down worldwide shipping overnight,"  said House 
                                                 
5CDR John Wood, USCG.  Maritime Domain Awareness Brief. (November 9, 2006).  
6U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for 
the National Strategy for Maritime Security, open-file report, 3 (October 2005). 
7House Committee on Homeland Security website, accessed November 12, 2006. 
http://homeland.house.gov/news/latestNews/20060504-SAFEPort/PR_SAFE_Port_Markup_042606.pdf,.   
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Majority Leader John A. Boehner; so what about the percentage that do not get screened? 
8  MDA intends to fill the gaps mentioned above by gathering intelligence from other 
agencies and sources to detect anomalies and possible threats.  Can the current MDA 
program plug these holes and provide our country with 100% protection? 
 
C. STATUS OF MDA PROGRAM 
 The MDA program has great intentions, objectives and looks great on paper.  
However, operationally, it lacks the effectiveness and efficiency required to keep our 
country safe.  September 11, 2001 was an eye opener for many defense related agencies, 
but the MDA program would only be slightly better off by simply working harder.  The 
maritime domain has become too complex for current systems, operations and processes.  
Figure 2 illustrates where we believe the program stands today.  The MDA program 
today is highlighted in blue and shows how it has progressed from not knowing the 
identification and location of maritime vessels to knowing roughly 60%.  The other 40% 
is intelligence the agencies involved in tracking and identifying need to know. 
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Figure 2.    Current MDA Program 
                                                 
8Jonathan Weisman, “House Passes $7.4 Billion Port Security Bill,” Washington Post, 5 May 2006, 
sec. A04. 
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The MDA program lacks the resources and tools necessary to provide timely and 
accurate maritime domain information to the correct agency.  There are tools that are 
underutilized, some that are in production and others that are yet to be put on paper.  One 
example of an underutilized tool is the Automatic Identification System (AIS).  AIS is an 
unclassified broadcast system that acts like a transponder and sends/receives very 
important information via VHF maritime band.  These units are commonly found on 
merchant vessels around the world but have the capability to be installed on land in choke 
points or along the coast, buoys, warships and any other place within line of sight range 
of a vessel.  The International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated in December, 
2000 that AIS to be fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards that are 
engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards that are 
not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships, irrespective of size, built on or 
after 1 July 2002. 9  The information can be overlaid onto a radar screen; every contact on 
the screen will show course, speed, position, ship name, MMSI number, IMO number, 
call sign, type of cargo, ship dimension, destination, and ETA, provided it is equipped 
with AIS. 10   
To stress the importance of this data, here is an example.  Ship ‘A’ gets underway 
from Spain saying it is en route to Canada.  However, the ship is a rogue ship and is 
steaming towards the United States carrying a nuclear explosive.  If a warship was in 
range, equipped with AIS, it could possibly detect the vessel not on the appropriate 
course needed to reach Canada and further interrogate the vessel as to why it was heading 
towards the United States.  This information could then be transmitted to a processing 
center to decide if a threat exists. 
Detecting the anomaly above is not as easy as it sounds because the water space is 
extremely vast; detecting a vessel in this scenario before it enters U.S. waters is the 
challenge.  Currently, AIS is not required on U.S. Navy vessels, however it is used in the 
Coast Guard.  It is also not required on all maritime vessels at this time nor is it installed 
                                                 
9International Maritime Organization web site, accessed September 14, 2006.  
http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=155. 
10USCG Navigation web site, accessed September 10, 2006.  http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/default.htm.  
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on any buoys or along the coast.  AIS is only one tool that would help identify the 
maritime picture if put into play more aggressively.   
If the success of the MDA program was only about implementing additional tools 
then we would be able to make more technological recommendations as to what the 
program needed.  Unfortunately, a big reason why the MDA program is deficient is also 
because of intangible reasons.  MDA has too many cultural and sensitivity barriers 
between and across various agencies.  Getting all agencies to fully cooperate and share 
information with one another is a major weakness.  Agencies such as the U.S. Navy, 
USCG, DEA, CIA, FBI and the various other intelligence agencies are not working 
together to form the Common Operating Picture (COP) that the MDA program needs.  
This includes foreign countries that could also integrate their intelligence for the greater 
good.  Many agencies and countries feel their information is too sensitive to share with 
other agencies and countries.  There are hard classification issues that can not be 
compromised, but MDA lacks the ability to strip sensitive material in a timely manner to 
enter the information into the COP.  
Timely information and decision making is the key to success in any battle.  
Having information and making a command decision before the enemy can is proven to 
be the most effective way to win a battle.  MDA does not allow the information to flow in 
a timely matter to the appropriate agency.  The barriers currently in place and the manual 
processes used to transfer the data will keep 100% MDA from being achievable.  For the 
information to be timely there needs to be a COP into which all information can be fed 
for all agencies to view.  MDA does not provide that capability. 
Currently, agencies have to manually search for information on vessels of interest 
vice being fed or having the ability to access information from a common database.  
Furthermore, MDA lacks either an automated process which filters information to the 
right agency or more analysts to manually strip the data and then distribute.    
The display currently in use for the U.S. Navy, USCG and other intelligence 
agencies is the GCCS-M system.  GCCS-M claims to be near real-time but due to its 
manual nature it is often time late.  Once a track is entered, the system tracks the contact 
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based on the operator’s last entered course and speed.  These contacts can sometimes be 
days time late, which is unacceptable for tracking today’s threat.  It will take time to 
transition towards another command and Control (C2) system with more automation 
because it is so widely used by the U.S. Navy, USCG and other intelligence centers.  
There are, however, more advanced C2 systems being designed. 
Accuracy of the information is also deficient.  The time and effort required to 
build a single track from the various agencies’ informational databases is directly 
correlated to the accuracy of the data sometimes provided.  Customers receive data from 
various resources and a common frustration is determining if a difference between 
external reports is an anomaly or operator error.  Often it is the latter but we can not 
afford to not be 100% accurate in locating and identifying potential threats.  For instance, 
if a GCCS operator onboard a U.S. Naval vessel reports vessel ‘A’ as having 21 
crewmembers instead of 11 because the operator read the lookouts handwriting wrong, 
then the agency receiving this information would detect an anomaly.  Vessel ‘A’ left port 
with 11 crewmembers, where did they pick up 10 extra crewmembers?  This is a common 
problem because of operator error and the processes involved do not provide checks and 
balances.  There are hundreds of resources and sensors available but if they are not 
interconnected, an accurate picture of a contact is not timely.   
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III. COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS (CMA) 
A. DESCRIPTION OF CMA  
Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) is the means to achieve MDA.  
CMA and MDA share the common goal of achieving full domain awareness, except 
CMA is all encompassing.  CMA also separates itself because it is a new initiative to 
achieve maritime domain awareness by using more tools and resources in a more 
automated and streamlined fashion.  MDA is achievable through CMA because of its 
service oriented architecture (SOA).  SOA is the heart of CMA because it allows 
software services, processes, new and old technologies to be loosely connected.  SOA is 
not one specific technology rather a network of technologies or independent services that 
work together to allow multiple users to benefit from each other’s information.  Through 
a SOA framework, CMA integrates the effort of joint forces, both foreign and domestic, 
along with every agency involved in tracking the threats we face today within the 
maritime domain. 
CMA is an endless pool into which new tools and resources will be dumped.  
Each item, whether a physical system, new idea, critical eye, etc. put into this pool will 
allow CMA to come alive and achieve its plans.  It is dynamic in every aspect because 
CMA evolves with the threat to be successful.  CMA takes advantage of newer 
technologies because the customers involved in CMA are constantly looking for 
upgrades, new systems, sensors and more interagency communication.  More 
communication allows for brand new ideas and information to flow more quickly. 
In the first phase of CMA, customers will view information from displays like 
GCCS-M, Generic Area Limitation Environment (GALE-LITE), Command and Control 
Personal Computer (C2PC), and the Distributed Common Ground System-Navy (DCGS) 
which get fed information from where track fusion and dissemination occurs.  The 
customers who draw on this information include Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 
MIFC, COCOMs, Republic of Singapore (RoS), USCG, Port Authorities and various 
Law Enforcement Agencies.  Track fusion and dissemination occurs in the Joint World 
Wide Communications System (JWICS), the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
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(SIPRNet), the Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) 
and the Common Distributed Virtual Database Information Extraction System 
(CDVD/IE).  The network and systems draw upon seemingly endless multi-level data 
sources.  The multi-level data sources include national data sources, ready web services 
(RWS) and sensitive but unclassified other web services (OWS SBU).  RWS assets 
include sensors installed afloat and ashore, data we receive from the RoS and the Joint 
Maritime Information Extraction sight.  OWS SBU assets include the AIS, ship position 
reports, advanced afloat and ashore sensors and law enforcement.   The list of assets and 
resources are vast but each plays an integral role in painting the maritime picture. 
The data is fused to form “Super Tracks” and is further disseminated with regards 
to classification level and relevance.  JWICS is simply a communication path used by C2 
to coordinate tracks and send information.  It is capable of secure video/data within the 
defense intelligence community, which can come from a transmission of files to real time 
two-way video teleconferencing between sites.  The SIPRNet is DoD’s largest 
interoperable command and control data network.  It supports the GCCS, the Defense 
Message System (DMS), collaborative planning and numerous other classified warfighter 
applications.  The NIPRNet provides seamless interoperability for unclassified combat 
support applications, as well as controlled access to the Internet.   CDVD/IE is a new 
database that fuses intelligence data at multiple levels using a wide array of sensors and 
resources.  CDVD/IE is a component of VTP and will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 
B. CMA OBJECTIVES 
The futuristic goal or final phase of CMA is to track 100 percent of maritime 
traffic, prioritize each track and identify the threats with flawless accuracy.  After 
identification, the information will be sent to the involved DOD entity, government 
agency or coalition force for appropriate action.  For the above process to happen at the 
level described, certain objectives need to be achieved.  The objectives that CMA intends 
to achieve cover the shortfalls of the current MDA program.  With CMA, the 
identification and location of all maritime vessels is known with a stronger level of 
confidence. Figure 3 shows how the lower right quadrant is closer to being filled in with 
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blue which means the identification and location of all maritime vessels is better known.  
The absolute final phase of this JCTD is to have the entire chart highlighted in blue so as 
to say that every single thing within the maritime domain is known.     
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Figure 3.    Future MDA Program with CMA 
 
The first phase or step of CMA strives to lower the barriers between the different 
agencies and services involved by introducing this concept and its capabilities.  Using a 
GCCS based system, information sharing will probably still be considered a manual 
process compared to the final phase of CMA, but the role of security guards will be 
emphasized.  In the early phase, the placement of security guards or analysts will be 
needed to ensure sensitive material is not shared with the wrong people.  With an increase 
of automation, there could be an increase in risk of leaking classified material so 
databases will be tailored to the user and have multiple levels of security access.  As 
CMA evolves, however, systems like VTP intend to guard against security leaks while 
adding automation.  Evolution depends on the researchers involved in not only 
determining the vulnerabilities that exist in our current system and ways to fix them. but 
which customers should be granted certain information. 
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Under CMA, new tools have emerged to automate the entire process and detect 
anomalies.  These tools will greatly improve the ability to link vessel position 
information with possible threats.  The automation will not only make the process faster, 
but it increases the efficiency and productivity of the analysts currently in place.  It 
breaks down the barriers between each agency and shares the information they gather 
with everyone else.  Once the information is able to flow more effectively and efficiently, 
customers like MIFC can build longer-duration tracks on surface vessels.  It enables 
information to flow more effectively because it brings together nearly 200 multi-level 
data sources, classifies each source, enters it into multiple databases then makes it 
available to the various customers to access and use.  This is a specific objective for 
automating the system.  Automation will occur at many levels, but there is great value in 
automatically determining anomalies and vulnerabilities and immediately informing the 
right agency.  Speed of information is only helpful if it is accurate, so CMA addresses 
accuracy by adding additional corroborative data sources to increase quality control.          
       
C. TOOLS OF CMA 
 1. Current Tools 
A benefit of CMA is that it can use old and new tools to achieve domain 
awareness.  There are currently some very effective tools used in the MDA program that 
CMA will utilize.  Some of these tools will become more effective and useful once 
certain objectives of CMA are achieved because fewer barriers will exist.  Breaking down 
the barriers will allow more agencies to exploit other agencies’ tools, spreading the 
benefit from one tool throughout all agencies by directly or indirectly sharing 
information.  The data sources currently available are military and national and are fed 
from an array of sources and sensors. 
The CMA concept is a joint effort and the key to its success is interoperability, 
coordination and cooperation.  It incorporates sensor inputs from naval and space assets, 
those you find at chokepoints or ports and tag data.  Sensor inputs are then correlated and  
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fused with intelligence from multiple sources as well as open commercial source 
information for use by the appropriate customer.  The current process is manual but CMA 
intends to add more automation. 
Each service or agency has their own tools to better achieve domain awareness.  
The Navy is an important asset because its nearly 300 ship fleet plays an integral role.  
On average, a third of that fleet is deployed and its sensors relay contact information to 
the necessary agencies ashore.  Most U.S. Naval vessels and COCOMS are equipped 
with the GCCS-M system, which is the Navy's primary fielded Command and Control 
System.  It enhances the operational commander’s warfighting capability and aids in the 
decision-making process by receiving, retrieving, and displaying information relative to 
the current tactical situation.  It is the common display system used by the USCG and 
MIFC as well. 
The most common sensors aboard these vessels are surface radars and lookouts, 
which relay information to the track supervisor who enters the track into GCCS-M.  This 
is the most manual of processes and can be followed up with a call for further 
information via bridge to bridge radio.  Other sensors include electronics intelligence 
(ELINT) that fingerprints ships by reading their electronic emissions.  Using the Tactical 
Data Information Exchange Subsystem (TADIX) and the Combined Enterprise Regional 
Information Exchange (CENTRIX) system, information is exchanged between ships 
worldwide.  Coalition warships can also support CMA by adding their tracks to the 
common operating picture. 
The USCG has a fleet of about 200 aircraft, over a thousand boats less than 65 
feet and over 200 ships greater than 65 feet.  The USCG is: 
A military, multimission, maritime service within the Department of 
Homeland Security and one of the nation's five armed services.  Its core 
roles are to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and 
security interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at 
risk, including international waters and America's coasts, ports, and inland 
waterways. 11 
                                                 
11USCG website, accessed on 5 September 2006. http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/. 
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USCG responsibilities include patrolling the nation's 361 ports and 95,000 miles 
of coastline, boarding and inspecting tens of thousands of cargo ships and recreational 
boats, and reviewing security at the nation's commercial ports.  In addition to the U.S. 
Navy, AIS is standard on most USCG vessels.  AIS is a proven system that can be used to 
automatically identify vessels also AIS equipped.  This sensor can be installed in 
chokepoints and harbor entrances, or on buoys and other navigational aids.  USCG 
vessels are integral to our port security because they operate primarily along the coastline 
of the United States and communicate directly to shore-based facilities. 
  
 2. Future Tools 
The first step to achieve Domain Awareness is to bring more tools into the 
system.  The list of our current tools appears sufficient but more tools are needed to 
automate the entire process.  Items that are currently being considered for CMA include 
the following: 
• Vessel Tracking Program 
• The Computer Assisted Threat Evaluation (CATE) Threat Assessment Tools 
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Tools for Maritime COP, 
FASTC2AP and Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activities (PANDA), 
a behavior analysis resource. 
• Extensible Tactical C4I Framework 
• Extensible Common Operating Picture (XCOP) 
• Combat Identification:  Information Management of Coordinated Electronic (EC 
06-01) 
  
An objective of VTP is to decrease the time needed to process a track so it is 
possible to track 100 vessels per hour for ships greater than 100 GRT.  This goal can be 
met by providing more accurate information and by automating the development of 
vessel tracks.  Automation is expected in the data acquisition, validation, fusion, 
correlation and track generation phases, which will ultimately reduce manpower.  VTP 
will create and associate actionable intelligence to “Super Tracks” by fusing data from 
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roughly 200 different sources.  Fusing this data will be highly automated while still 
building detailed tracks.   Anomaly detection will also occur once the track is entered.  
The information it produces will generate a classified picture for personnel with 
clearances and an unclassified picture for local law enforcement and other unclassified 
agencies to view. 
VTP correlates multiple sensor capabilities in a MDA Layered Defense Concept, 
including non-cooperative vessel tracking.  The sensors and tools included in this layered 
defense combine the sensors and tools currently used to track maritime traffic with 
additional advanced sensors specifically designed for VTP.  The sensors for this layered 
defense include the following.  First, VTP will leverage the technology already in use by 
extending the range on the AIS system, creating the AIS/ER system.  In addition to 
installing AIS on all maritime vessels and strategically placing them in littoral areas or on 
buoys, VTP intends to install them on military and commercial aircraft.  Installing them 
on aircraft will create a link of AIS transponders that has the potential to extend the range 
to roughly 2000nm.  Second, a High Frequency Surface Wave Radar will be installed on 
various naval assets to track vessels greater than 25 feet, out to approximately 100nm.  
Third, a shore based transportable unit, called a Modular Sensor System (MSS), will be 
installed in various locations that house several subsystems.  The MSS uses surface 
search radar with a range of about 24nm; it also has a Radio Frequency direction finder, a 
specific emitter identification system, and a local VHF AIS transponder. The sensors will 
also include acoustic data from coastal sonar buoys and optics from shore. 
The cornerstone of the VTP project is the Common Distributed Virtual Database 
Information Extraction (CDVD/IE) system.  The goal of this system is to process 
approximately 100 tracks per hour for ships greater than 100 GRT at higher confidence 
levels.  At a remote local, intelligence information is collected & processed in this system 
component.  The CDVD/IE system provides automation through alerts based on 
programmed rule sets, as well as any anomalies detected in the track data. 
VTP expects to increase track capacity to 20,000 identified tracks, as opposed to 
roughly 200 high interest vessels that are manually tracked today.  It is also expected to 
process tracks in less than .33hr, where the current process takes four to eight hours.  
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Automated systems like VTP are designed for the greater than 50,000 vessels over 
300GRT that are engaged in international maritime commerce, but the final phase of 
CMA is to track all maritime vessels.  VTP is only one stepping stone on the path to 
achieve full MDA; when it reaches its capability it will greatly enhance the maritime 
picture. 
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IV. THE BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS (BCA) 
  
One of the greatest hurdles that faces the Department of Defense is measuring the 
value associated with new technology systems and the processes that function within, and 
in conjunction with, these systems.  During the research for this BCA, it was discovered 
that other studies have been done on new emerging systems such as Open Architecture 
and MDA.  These studies were done using Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
Methodology on these systems.  (KVA was discovered late in this research and was not 
used in any calculations, but it will be discussed further in the conclusions of this 
research). 
Building a business case on new technology or processes without revenue 
associated with the given output has been a difficult problem within the DoD and DON.  
In the commercial world, value can be measured through the revenue generated by a 
system, or by the cost savings that the system may achieve.  However, within the Federal 
Government (specifically the Department of the Navy) and, for that matter, any non-
revenue generating entity, monetary revenue is not always an easily interpreted 
measurement of value.  It is not the goal of this research to assign value to the specific 
processes of MDA, but to determine if CMA is a course of action that is a sound business 
decision.  
 
A. WHAT IS A BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS (BCA)? 
A Business Case Analysis (BCA) examines and compares the benefits, costs, and 
uncertainties of each alternative to determine the most cost effective means of achieving 
the objective.  It is a systematic approach to the problem of resource allocation, 
comparing two or more alternatives in terms of cost and benefits.  The standard steps in a 
BCA are below: 
 
• Defining the objectives of the action being considered 
• Specifying assumptions/constraints 
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• Identifying alternatives 
• Listing the benefits for all feasible alternatives 
• Estimating costs for each feasible alternative 
• Ranking alternatives in terms of costs and benefits 
• Analyzing risk/uncertainty  
• Providing conclusions/recommendations 
 
A BCA is a process for preparing a structured proposal that establishes sound 
business decisions for proceeding with an investment/project by providing decision 
makers with insight into how the investment/project supports business needs and strategic 
goals.  The BCA structures the assessment by providing necessary information 
concerning the scope, alternatives considered, estimated costs, Return on Investment 
(ROI) and risks for decision makers to make an informed funding decision for the 
investment/project.  Each BCA will be different depending on its application. However, a 
BCA structure should include the following, as a minimum. 12 
Introduction. It presents the objectives addressed by the subject of the case, and 
all the options, including the status quo, considered to achieve the objective. 
Assumptions and Methods. Outlines the rules for deciding what belongs in the 
case, and what does not, along with the critical assumptions. 
Business Impacts. The main business case results. 
Sensitivity and Risk Analysis. Shows how results depend on the important 
assumptions (“what if”), as well as the likelihood for other results to surface. 
Conclusions and Recommendations. Recommends specific actions based on 
business objectives and the results of the analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Acquisition Community Connection (ACC) [2004], Business Case Analysis. 
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1. The BCA Process 
Figure 7 displays the BCA process consisting of four steps. 
Definition is the first step in the BCA process and sets the scope of the problem. 
During this step, the assumptions and the constraints are formulated which will guide the 
BCA Team throughout the process.  The alternatives to be considered are also identified 
in this step, as well as the metrics to compare alternatives. 
Data Collection is the second step in the BCA process and involves identifying 
the source and types of data to be collected. Collecting data may be difficult because the 
data may be obscured in databases in remote locations or buried in budget documents. 
Evaluation Analysis is the third step in the BCA process and includes the “number 
crunching”. In this step, the data that was collected in the second step is used to build a 
case for each alternative, using both qualitative and quantitative data.  Each alternative is 
compared against each other, in an effort to identify a best alternative.  It is important that 
analysts should not only seek to determine which alternative has the lowest cost, but 
which alternative provides the optimal combination of price and performance. 
Results Presentation is the fourth step in the BCA process.  This is a critical step 
because if the BCA Team is unable to effectively communicate the results to the decision 
makers, the analysis is worthless. 
Conclusions are to be organized around the initial objectives stated in the case.  
The BCA could recommend staying with the status quo or adopting the alternative(s) 
being considered. 
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Figure 4.    The BCA Process13 
 
B. POTENTIAL INCURRED COSTS (MDA WITHOUT CMA) 
One perspective to consider when valuing a successful CMA program is to 
compare the cost of programs like VTP, which are in the acquisition phase, to the cost to 
rebuild a major city.  Estimating the cost to rebuild a city is extremely difficult, especially 
when you consider all the intangible and hidden costs associated with the loss of an entire 
city.  The most current way to comprehend the loss of a city is to briefly analyze the 
natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina, and the destruction of New Orleans.  The cost to 
rebuild New Orleans has been estimated to be roughly $200 billion and is analogous to 
the destruction of a city caused by a nuclear bomb brought in on a ship. 
There are many factors that should be considered when doing such an analysis.  
Cost figures range when estimating the cost of human life.  Estimates range but the $200 
                                                 
13Acquisition Community Connection (ACC) [2004], Business Case Analysis. 
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billion figure probably does not include the cost of life which has been estimated to be in 
the millions per person.  The metropolitan New Orleans area had a population before the 
hurricane around 1.3 million, but a large number evacuated so many lives were saved.14  
If a nuclear bomb went off in the city there would probably not be any warning.  Aside 
from the loss of human life, there are many other costs to consider.  There will be 
tremendous physical and emotional suffering of the survivors, increased medical costs, 
overfilled hospitals and inadequate living conditions for many years following the 
incident. 
Direct costs associated with the loss of a city can be evaluated by insurance 
companies, but they do not cover all costs.  There are obvious short-term costs, and then 
there are costs associated with long-term effects that are more difficult to estimate given 
the factor of time, inflation, energy costs, insurance company bankruptcy and housing 
reconstruction difficulties.  These second order, longer term costs include the impact on 
city tourism, the cost to displace thousands of people to other cities and political/social 
unrest. 
In retrospect, the city of New Orleans could have been protected from a category 
five hurricane at a fraction of the cost to repair the entire city after complete destruction.  
The cost to protect the city would have been primarily for reinforcing and/or replacing 
the levees used to keep flood water out.  Building a flood protection system able to cope 
with a category five hurricane in New Orleans is a small investment given the potential 
benefit. However, concerning the low probability of a category five hurricane actually 
striking, the investment seemed much larger and not worth the cost. 
So, why choose Hurricane Katrina?  This scenario is presented because investing 
in CMA has the potential to avoid the destruction of major cities like New Orleans.  
CMA is global, meaning it simultaneously benefits more than one city, which makes 
valuing the benefit even more difficult.  The probability of a terrorist attack and the 
probability it will occur within the maritime domain are factors that influence whether an  
 
                                                 
14The New Orleans Convention and Visitors Bureau website accessed 10 December, 2006. 
http://www.neworleanscvb.com/faq/index.cfm/action/Cover. 
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investment should be made.  If CMA is implemented and VTP is acquired and performs 
to its designed capabilities at a cost of $39 million, cost is potentially insignificant 
compared to destruction costs. 
 
C. CMA COST (MDA WITH CMA) 
On two research trips to the Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers 
(MIFC) data was collected on the current MDA architecture, track management and track 
processes, information flow, intelligence system structure, hardware and software issues 
and various other topics of concern.  Much time was spent on what new technologies 
were coming online and what impact a new MDA architecture would have on their track 
management processes.  Over the years since 9/11, many improvements have been made 
to the current system and many new technologies have been brought online proving to be 
more effective than legacy systems.  There is continuous improvement to MDA 
management, and adding the systems associated with the new CMA architecture will 
only further improve the watchstander’s ability to manage and track the multitude of 
commercial vessels around the globe. 
The first set of data we analyzed was taken from CMA JCTD program documents 
that details who is providing funds for the first four years of CMA testing and 
implementation.  It is assumed that the majority of this funding is for the CDVD console, 
which is being fielded and tested at present.  No other funding data was found on fielding 
or training for other MDA/CMA components.  As previously discussed, most of the 
CMA architecture is pre-existing in the current MDA scheme of operations. 
In Figure 5, the funding data for the CMA JCTD to cover four fiscal years shows 
a net cost of $39M.  This value includes funding trails from many different sources, 
including $5.3M from the RoS (Republic of Singapore) for joint operational testing of 
CMA with the RoS. 
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Figure 5.    CMA JCTD Funding15 
 
Other funding data for CMA was pulled from the OSD RDT&E Project 
Justification (R2a Exhibit) for FY07.  The CMA JCTD has been budgeted for $6.5M in 
FY07 plans, which includes “baseline and demonstrate CMA technologies”. 16  This 
value is comparable to the DUSD (AS&C) FY07 data in Figure 5. 
The next set of data collected was from SME at the MIFCs that pertained to 
personnel numbers and cost of running a MIFC watchteam to conduct track management 
and provide intelligence information to the rest of the MDA architecture.  This data is 
relevant to a BCA to calculate total cost of a system. Assumptions made for these 
calculations are as follows: 
Work Year = 52 Weeks 
Work Week = 42 Hours 
Watch = 12 Hours 
OJT = 6 Hours per Watch 
Avg Watchstander Annual Income (E-5 w/ 8 yrs) = $28,82517 
                                                 
15Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) 
Implementation Directive. December 20, 2005. 
16OSD RDT&E Project Justification, FY07. 
17The Military.com web site, accessed October 25, 2006.  
http://www.military.com/Registration/Pay_Chart?backURL=2006-military-pay-charts. 
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With this data, we can calculate the cost per track generation and figure this into 
an ROI equation for the BCA.  As discussed in the MDA and CMA chapters, track 
generation in the current MDA system averages 200 vessels of interests (VOI) per day. 
 
Figure 6.    Track Cost Estimate 
 
The current MDA track generation process allows a watchteam to generate and 
manage 200 VOI’s per day at a labor cost of $2.38 per track.  Improving MDA to CMA 
architecture will allow the same watchteam to track up to 2000 VOI’s per day, decreasing 
the labor cost to $0.24 per track.  This is a cumulative decrease of 900% in cost. 
By improving technology and the system used to generate and manage tracks, the 
MIFC watchteam becomes significantly more effective.  This has been an ongoing 
process over the last several years and will continue to improve with new equipment and 
technologies.  Another variable to consider is the increased value gained from improved 
processes and what will be gained from improved intelligence gathering techniques, but 
this will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 
 
 
 
MDA Threat ID Tracking Process      
(MIFC Pacific)        
Function Tracks/Day # Employees/ Cost/Employee Cost/Week Cost/Track % Change
    Day Per Week       
              
Track Gen (MDA) 200 6 $554.33 $3,325.96 $2.38   
              
Track Gen (CMA) 2000 6 $554.33 $3,325.96 $0.24 900%
              
Assumptions             
Work Year:   52 Weeks    
Work Week:   42 Hours    
Watch:   12 Hours    
OJT:   6 Hrs/Watch    
Watchstander (E-5 w/8yrs) Annual Income $28,825.00 (This is the "average" watchstander) 
Market Comparable Annual Income   $37,472.50       
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D. THE BCA DILEMMA 
Many problems surfaced in formulating the analysis and comparing the “as-is” to 
the “to-be” data.  The first issue was the sparse data available regarding development and 
fielding dollar costs for the CMA JCTD.  Many functions and components are already in 
place and there is no cost incurred to field hardware or train personnel on new equipment.  
Next, valuing improved technology in the DoD is next to impossible and considering the 
difficulty in assigning revenue and costs to different processes and functions. 
Looking just at the improvements CMA will offer one MIFC could be enough to 
make a decision to pursue this added technology.  However, that is not all that goes into a 
complete ROI analysis; more has to be considered.  
As discussed in the previous sections, addressing the costs/rewards of MDA and a 
new CMA system, it is difficult to determine ROI given the huge rewards and gains from 
the new system.  How is value placed upon saving 9/11 or Katrina type damage to a 
major U.S. city?  What value is placed on preventing a dirty bomb or biological weapon 
from entering a major port of entry?  These key variables are enormous and, 
unfortunately, can not be valued in a standard ROI calculation. 
Another problem to consider is that CMA is not a completely new acquisition 
(like a new Joint Strike Fighter or DDX type program) but a continuation of existing 
technology with enhanced capabilities of legacy system.  CMA does include some new 
hardware acquisitions (VTP/CDVD, MSS, etc.), but the cost of these acquisitions are 
relatively insignificant in the large scheme of MDA. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
From the start of this MBA project report, the architecture of MDA and the 
progression to CMA has been detailed as best as possible.  The concepts and technology 
of the new thought progressions to CMA seem to be going in the right direction.  
Sometimes in the military acquisition process we add new systems or make 
changes/improvements to existing systems just for the sake of upgrading or adding new 
technology without first looking at the cost and benefits of these changes/additions.  In 
the case of CMA, performing testing and integration of technologies while still in the 
JCTD process allows for actual field use and testing prior to pushing the system through 
the acquisition process.  This allows for problems and issues to come forward prior to 
large amounts of funding and personnel time being wasted on a system that is un-proven 
or of little actual value to the military components. 
On the other side, our thesis was unable to perform a detailed BCA due to the lack 
of hard financial data available.  This is the case with many new systems in the pre-
acquisition process and much research has been done on these systems both at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and by other government agencies.  Without financial 
numbers and hard data for analysis, the nature of our recommendations will be based on 
the knowledge gained and the value we deemed from that knowledge.  We asked the 
question “is this a good decision?” and we believe we have found that answer.  Our group 
is giving a strong recommendation to pursue advanced technologies to improve MDA 
capabilities.  Further analysis can be done using other valuation methods that will solidify 
our recommendation. 
In the course of this research, other methods were discovered that can be of great 
use when dealing with the problems that we had in building an adequate BCA.  
Previously mentioned KVA methodology has recently and is now being used by other 
research groups at this school and on ACTD and JCTD projects.  KVA is a 
methodological approach to allow value to be assigned to processes in a system and 
assigns common output metrics to compare alternatives.  Commercial or private 
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industries are using this methodology to value outputs of non-revenue producing entities 
in their organizations.  This allows for comparisons and analyses to be conducted 
between different departments and divisions of an organization to determine their 
effectiveness and find areas of improvement, etc. A more complete description of KVA 
has been included in Appendix B of this research. 
Another valuable tool discovered during this research was Real Options 
Analysis.18  This is a system produced by another NPS Professor, Dr Johnathan Mun, 
which includes methodology and software to conduct valuation and analysis of options 
based on risk and methods of valuation.  The base software includes a Super Lattice 
Solver and Risk Simulator which runs similar to the basic solver add-ins to Microsoft 
Excel.  The software is capable of conducting Real Options Analysis, Monte Carlo 
Simulation, Forecasting and Optimization.  The Real Options Analysis system can be 
used with these types of projects to value and analyze processes and systems that do not 
produce revenue or do not have intrinsic value to the organization. 
Subject Matter Experts at both sites visited were very helpful and insightful in the 
usefulness and the need for improved methods and technologies with MDA track 
management.  Improvements in IT and intelligence data sharing within the DoD is a key 
factor in meeting the goals and directives of our leaders to improve and become masters 
of the Maritime Domain.  With the valued insight of the SME’s who manage and work in 
MDA on a daily basis, this group has found that any improvements, including large leaps 
to a CMA architecture, would be well worth the cost to the DoD.  Saving ourselves from 
ourselves has become something of a norm in our line of work, and this system is no 
exception.  Anything that can be done to prevent or possibly eliminate the chances of 
large scale destruction of a major port area or city would be welcomed. Our group and 
the many members of the community responsible for managing the data that can help 
accomplish what is required would welcome improvements to processes and systems that 
protect our citizens and infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
18Johnathan Mun, Real Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic Investments and 
Decisions, ed. Arch G. Woodside, 2nd edition. (Wiley Publishers, 2006).  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis focused on the current MDA architecture and the need for 
improvements through new technologies and processes such as CMA.  Our question for 
this thesis was “is this a sound course of action to pursue”.  With the information and data 
collected by this group, the DoD should pursue the acquisition of technologies that will 
improve our capabilities in the MDA realm.  Further analysis and research should be 
done with more detailed analysis of data to determine actual costs and benefits of the 
system.  CMA is a step in the right direction for the U.S. to attain the desired goal of total 
Maritime Domain Awareness and fully protect our seas and borders from possible future 
incursions or attacks. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
With a foundation being laid for the CMA JCTD project, there is still much to be 
learned and much research required in the area of measuring and determining the value of 
a CMA architecture for MDA.  Using the methods mentioned in the previous sections, a 
more detailed analysis should be performed both on the macro and micro levels to 
determine the effectiveness and increased efficiencies of introducing new IT to the MDA 
process.  A KVA methodology analysis should be performed on intelligence gathering 
watchteams (such as a MIFC, NORTHCOM Intel Center, etc) to fully demonstrate the 
use of CMA on a micro level within the organization. 
There are several groups that we met with that are currently conducting research 
at NPS using these types of techniques to evaluate and analyze both MDA and CMA 
components.  Their research, in conjunction with the results presented here, will further 
develop the business case for CMA, showing that this technology is a prudent 
investment. 
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APPENDIX B: KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED (KVA) 
METHODOLOGY19 
In 1996 the Clinger-Cohen Act (also ITMRA) was mandated to provide a 
measurement of performance of the federal governments information technology 
systems, and that measure would be determined by “how well the information technology 
supports the programs of the executive agency” (ITMRA). This was taken further by then 
Secretary of Defense Cohen to define a means of evaluation that will “utilize mission 
outcome based performance measurements as the cornerstone for information technology 
performance assessments” (Annual Defense Report, 1999). With the foundation set for 
the performance metrics, specific measurements and indicators are left to the program 
managers of system programs. 
The KVA methodology applies the idea that the inherent knowledge in a process 
is a viable determinant of the process’ value. Through the application of the KVA 
methodology, knowledge within core processes of an organization can be measured and 
the resulting return on knowledge can be used to provide a means of evaluating multiple 
processes through common units of measurement. 
This methodology does not require that the common units be reflected in the form 
of monetary or financial value. The processes within the operational context of a watch 
team can, through KVA, all be described in common units of output, the resulting 
productivity ratio (ROK) can then be evaluated to determine where efficiencies may be 
obtained. 
Applying KVA methodology toward a business case analysis can show a given 
outcome with changes in inputs to a system. New technologic developments which cause 
improvements in the core processes of the system will display returns as ROK. 
 
 
                                                 
19Uchytil, Joseph.  “Assessing the Operational Value of Situational Awareness for Aegis and Ship 
Self Defense Systems (SSDS) Platforms Through the Application of the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
Methodology.” 
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A. THE KVA SOLUTION 
1.  Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory 
Developed by Dr. Thomas Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) and Dr. Valery 
Kanevsky (Agilent Labs) over 15 years ago, KVA is a means to value the knowledge 
assets within an organization. Built upon complexity (measure of common unit of 
change) theory, the methodology asserts that core processes within an organization 
process inputs and add value to those inputs, changing the inputs into outputs through 
some application of change, thereby producing an output that has exhibited a 
transformation from the original input. The theory states that the difference (i.e., change) 
between the inputs from that of the outputs is the value provided by the organization’s 
assets (i.e., people, processes or IT systems) which acted upon the inputs. In this manner, 
we can see that the knowledge within a process is proportional to the amount of change 
made to an input to produce the output. This knowledge value, measured in standard units 
of output, facilitates the analysis of multiple, differing processes throughout an 
organization, and empowers management to make more informed decisions concerning 
their core processes. 
Knowledge embedded in core processes of an organization can now be evaluated 
and compared across the entire organization. KVA produces a common unit of 
knowledge that serves as a surrogate for units of output in a standard way (Housel and 
Bell, 2001), and in doing so, provides a decision support mechanism for those within the 
organization to make more informed decisions concerning the insertion of information 
technology into the processes. With a better understanding of where knowledge assets 
reside, a more in depth evaluation of an organization’s processes can be achieved where 
efficiencies can be expanded upon and deficiencies can be rooted out and changed. 
 
2. KVA Assumptions 
With any methodology or framework there are certain assumptions that must be 
addressed so that a basic understanding can be agreed upon and the level of uncertainty 
can be mitigated. With KVA, the following assumptions apply: 
1. There must be an input, a process that acts upon the input to produce an output. 
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2. The type of process (i.e., IT system, employees, procedures etc.) which acts upon the 
input is irrelevant to the measure of change. 
3. Should the input equal the output, then there was no change, nor any value added from 
the process. 
4. Value created by the process is relative to the change that the process applies to the 
input. 
5. Change is measured by the amount of knowledge required to produce the change. 
6. Accepting 4 and 5 above, value and knowledge are then related. 
7. Knowledge can be defined as the amount of time it takes an average learner to acquire 
the knowledge. 
 
These assumptions are visually represented in Figure 5, below. 
 
Figure 5. Assumptions of KVA (Housel and Bell, 2001) 
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3. KVA Approaches 
The KVA methodology presents a very robust and dynamic framework that can 
use three different approaches for capturing the knowledge inherent in the core processes 
within an organization. While these approaches vary in application, neither is better or 
worse than the other, they simply present different collection means for deriving a result. 
It is important to note that once an approach is decided upon, it should be applied 
consistently throughout the organization. Processes cannot be correctly evaluated if they 
use differing approaches to determine their value. While the learning time approach is 
applicable to this thesis, each of the three methods is described in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Three Approaches to KVA (Housel and Bell, 2001) 
 37
a.  Learning Time 
This approach uses a measurement based on the time it would take an 
average person to learn the process in question. The measurements must be in common 
units of time (i.e., hours, days, weeks etc.) and should be verifiably reliable. To obtain the 
learning time measurements, all time required to learn the process must be indicated. This 
may include training at a formal school, on-the-job-training (OJT), distance education 
and any other source of training that would be relevant to the generation of an output by 
means of the process indicated. Generally SME’s, training manuals and standard 
operating procedures can provide a means for determining the actual learning time, 
although this type of information gathering can be prone to subjectivity. To avoid this 
and mitigate the risk of obtaining erroneous data, a correlation among two estimates can 
be calculated to ensure the most reliable and accurate data has been provided. Correlation 
can be achieved by obtaining an ordinal ranking based on the difficulty to learn each sub 
process within the organization. SME’s are asked to rank order each sub process in order 
of difficulty to learn. This ranking is then correlated against the actual learning time data 
that was provided. Should the two provide a correlation of 80% or greater, the data can be 
considered to be reliable. A correlation below 80% assumes a discrepancy in either the 
rank order or the actual amount of learning time required for each process. This can occur 
when SME’s do not completely understand the problem domain and provide learning 
time estimates that are faulty. Restructuring the learning time question or requesting a 
revalidation will normally be required. 
 
b. Process Description 
This approach measures the number of instructions needed to reproduce 
the outputs produced. Using the process description approach enables the KVA 
methodology to achieve a higher level of detail in the process description than does the 
learning time approach. It requires a more detailed and analytical description of each 
process and the amount of instructions needed to produce each output. The process 
instructions are calibrated in terms of their complexity. 
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c. Binary Query 
Utilizing the binary query approach requires the creation of a set of binary 
yes/no questions such that all possible outputs are represented as sequences of yes/no 
answers (i.e., bits). These sequences can then be calculated and value can be attributed to 
the outcome. 
 
B. RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE (ROK) 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) is the ratio of revenue allocated to each core area 
compared to its corresponding expenses (Housel and Bell, 2001). The essence of KVA is 
found in the ROK ratio that the methodology provides. As stated earlier, knowledge is a 
surrogate for common unit outputs, so ROK provides a means for determining a 24 
knowledge value to cost ratio for all processes within an organization. Proper application 
and analysis of ROK can provide an organization with a better understanding of the 
productivity of its knowledge assets, where they are located and how efficiently they are 
being applied throughout the organization. For non-revenue generating organizations this 
can be a force multiplier for validating processes and IT systems. 
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